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Introduction 
Club soccer today is bigger than it has ever been. The passion people have for their 
respective clubs can almost certainly be paralleled to that of their national teams. As a 
sport soccer goes above and beyond the theatrics witnessed on the field. The mechanics 
involved behind the scenes more often than not determine a club’s success, or lack of it. It 
is an international sport that elicits passion and pride among supporters culminating into a 
multimillion dollar business. And like any other firm in a market a club aims to maximise 
profits at the lowest possible costs.  
  An unavoidable result of the manner in which the soccer market operates is the rather 
evident disparity that exists amongst soccer clubs today. We have grown accustomed to 
viewing soccer in an environment tainted with disparity. Over the years, we have been 
desensitised to how bigger clubs such as Real Madrid and Manchester United seem to only 
grow bigger. While smaller clubs such as, Xerez and Portsmouth, have to contend with 
comparatively trivial issues pertaining to merely surviving.  
 
Factors that contribute to the Disparity 
The ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ in terms of resources, are labels that hold just as true in 
soccer as in any other economic environment. A natural question to ask would be what 
factors contributed to this disparity that is so apparent in soccer today. We will attempt to 
highlight some of these factors by analysing what clubs’ and players’ strive to achieve 
through their respective utility functions. 
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  Applying economic theory, we could customize the soccer club’s and players’ utility 
functions as follows: 
    U = f(X1 + X2 + X3…..Xn)  
where U is the benefit pursued (objective-attainment) and the Xi are factors or motivators 
that help achieve that benefit 
 
 
An Analysis of the Clubs’ Utility Function 
Several factors arguably motivate soccer clubs to maximize their utility on the field and on 
the business front as well. On the field they are primarily concerned with seeking 
recognition as a successful club, which consequently allows them to gain power and 
influence within the league that they compete as well as within their followers. On the 
business front soccer clubs are interested in developing a meaningful brand image through 
media coverage enabling more brand-loyal customers and a larger spectator base. This 
assists the club to enjoy economies of scale in production on and off the field, and attaining 
their main goal of profit maximization.  
  For the sake of exposition we could populate the club’s utility function as follows: 
 
U (Profit Maximisation) =Revenues (merchandising and sponsorship, match-day 
gate revenue, Broadcasting TV) – Costs (high talent, effective team 
management, team infrastructure) 
NOTE: economies of scale is a result of growth but not a direct objective 
 
Obviously soccer clubs would follow a causal logic chain that combines the above factors in 
order to achieve the maximum benefit possible. For instance, clubs recognise that their 
stock of high-talent players would increase their costs but would normally contribute more 
at the margin towards better team performance and an increase in their supporter base, 
culminating with an increase in the club’s net profit. Therefore, a club’s talent and its 
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management team in effect are the assets it purchases towards achieving successful 
outcomes, victories and championships. Such outcomes are usually the only way to gain a 
large fan base. This then transforms a soccer club into an attractive investment, attracting 
sponsorships, broadcasting TV rights as well as an increase in gate revenue.  
  As a result, soccer clubs now operate as rational firms that hire productive resources and 
organize them to produce and sell a particular product (performance and entertainment) 
in the pursuit of profit maximisation. Such products are traded in a market of monopolistic 
competition, where a club’s brand image differentiates it from its rivals and creates brand 
loyal customers. As clubs grow in size they benefit from further economies of scale emerges 
as a key factor that leads to the efficient use of resources. Therefore, a larger stadium and a 
higher attendance coupled with a wider media and broadcasting coverage of soccer games 
would arguably facilitate the production of the club’s product at a lower average cost.  
  However, the process described above seems to indicate that the above objectives are 
likely to only be achievable by a few soccer clubs that do attain success and are able to 
capitalize on that success with increasing returns enabling further economies of scale. For 
smaller clubs accessing such increasing returns that accompanies success is harder and 
they seem to be trapped in a situation where they simply cannot benefit from economies of 
scale. As a result the extant gap between the rich and poor clubs only seems to get bigger 
and more evident. Success is reserved just for those clubs that can invest vast amounts of 
capital in key resources that maximizes their potential to remain successful.  
 
Talent price and the Soccer Transfer Market (STM) 
In our view, the market characteristics of soccer clubs to some extent serve to increase this 
inequality. Consider, for instance, the Soccer Transfer Market (STM). Under the STM rules, 
soccer clubs buy and sell players by paying transfer fees that may even equal the GDP of 
certain small nations. The STM in effect allows certain clubs to flex their financial muscles. 
In 2009, Real Madrid made history in the STM by spending GBP136 million for Kaka and 
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Cristiano Rolando. This amount was approximately equivalent to the GDP generated by 
Tonga and Dominica in that year. (CIA, 2009).  
  How is it possible for a club to pay such an exorbitant sum of money for a soccer player? 
Certain clubs, such as Madrid, that value these exceptionally talented players, are willing to 
pay substantial transfer fees to employ their services. The more bargaining power a buying 
or selling club has, the more likely it is for them to negotiate mutually higher prices.  
 
Figure 1   (Adapted from McTaggart D., Findlay C., Parkin M., 2007)
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The figure above illustrates what happens in such an environment. Highly talented players, 
or “superstars”, are a scarce resource. Lower talent is not even considered a close 
substitute (T1). Since talent is accumulated with increasing returns, the real and time cost 
of developing further skills to match those of a superstar is prohibitively expensive for 
lower talented players making the acquisition of the expertise and skill that the superstar 
already has a relative bargain. Based on these factors, the supply curve for superstars 
becomes less elastic, which means irrespective of the price, the quantity supplied tends to 
remain fixed. As a result, the player’s price is magnified (P2) as his demand is concentrated 
to the few clubs that can afford it.   
 
An Analysis of the Players’ Utility Function 
What attracts a player to soccer in the first place? At the core is his primal love of the game. 
He grows up in a soccer influenced environment where he aspires to be the best. He would 
be exposed to the potential fame and fortune the game promises – the result of the 
phenomenal media coverage the game has always enjoyed. He would have had his 
favourites, and would have grown up idolizing them; hoping to someday parallel or maybe 
even surpass their achievements.   
Consequently, a player’s utility function can be described as a positive function of success 
– be it recognition or career income as well as the joy of playing and a negative function of 
the costs or sacrifices he must make to achieve success the game, which could arguably be 
lower for a superstar player due to his innate skills. 
 
U (Fame & Fortune) = f (professional success, joy of playing) – c (sacrifices such 
as time, effort to acquire skills, family life, etc.)  
 
Herein lies another reason for what may drive disparity in soccer. 
While it may be true that the interface between clubs and highly talent players occurs on 
the basis of the rational pursuit of utility, the history, tradition and overall reputation of 
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clubs matters a lot. Consider that the favourite former players of any new player would 
have at some point in their careers represented some top-tier club. In fact, it is when they 
were most likely to have attracted the admiration of the youngsters in question. In such a 
scenario, a self-selection process may arise whereby the next generation of aspiring soccer 
players would want to replicate the success of their idols by wishing to play at the same big 
clubs they played at.  It makes for a rather interesting self-sustaining situation since these 
bigger clubs, are almost always guaranteed premier talent. This is of course assuming that 
the clubs have managed their finances well, allowing them to remunerate the services of 
these potential superstars. 
 
Intervention 
Recent decades have seen notable changes in the market for soccer. The most significant 
was the Bosman Ruling implemented in 1995, which removed restrictions in the European 
labour market for soccer talent, and the introduction of the Champions’ League in its new 
format. (Haan, et. al., 2000) 
Now, the Champions League single-handedly is not the setback either, but it’s an 
outstanding example and a homespun one by UEFA at the same time. So we will stick to it 
for our purpose. The difficulty in broad spectrum is unequal booty for success. The upshot 
was that more clubs could benefit from a portion of the participating proceeds from the 
competition. This was done to regulate to promotion of a wider distribution of wealth.  
Another such intervention is to be instituted by European soccer’s governing body UEFA 
(Union of European Football Association) through ‘Financial Fair Play’. 
Currently, the major clubs’ have asymmetrical access to external finance compared to 
smaller clubs owing to their brand name. Smaller clubs have to be content with operating 
from whatever little revenue they can generate internally. UEFA wants to introduce the 
concept of ‘Financial Fair Play’ by 2012 as a precondition to participating in the most 
lucrative club competition – the Champions’ League.  Clubs will have to adjust their 
accounts and function within their financial means, presumably making the European 
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game more equitable and stable since they believe that the current levels of transfer fees 
cannot be sustained.  
 
Consequences 
Even though this intervention institutes penalties for those soccer teams that do not meet 
the new rule, it perhaps does not attack the root of the issue. The ex ante status quo would 
very likely still remain and the big clubs will surely remain the big clubs ex post as well. As 
such, competitive rights for being the best and most affluent of the clubs, would only be the 
reserve of major clubs following these guidelines.  
  The latest English club to break through the elite circle of Arsenal, Manchester and 
Liverpool was Chelsea, a very unsustainable club that injected hundreds of millions into 
transfers and wages to play regularly at Champions League football and a shot at winning a 
big trophy in return. The new laws rule this out even as a possibility making Europe’s 
domestic leagues even more likely to resist changes in the hierarchies, than they already 
are. 
The tagline of spending “within financial means” focuses on promoting the idea of 
expenditures being derived from revenue generated through soccer alone. This will 
arguably reinforce the status quo inequality across clubs. Clubs based in bigger cities and 
clubs with a fan following across the globe have the ability to generate more soccer-related 
revenue. Financial fair play therefore does not seem to be capable of stemming the 
problems of the inequality across clubs and the diminishing aspirations among prospective 
upcoming clubs and players. It may further even divert interest away from soccer towards 
other more lucrative sports. 
On a global level,while there have always been larger and smaller clubs. However, the 
globalization of soccer has made quite a few clubs bigger. Unfortunately, an even larger 
number of smaller clubs failed to benefit from this, thereby creating a disparity between 
the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ of soccer clubs. This disparity is a glaring and embarrassing 
“own goal” in the game of soccer. 
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